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NOTE
Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic
Underfunding in Indigent-Defense Systems
Emily Rose *
Across the country, underresourced indigent-defense systems create delays in
taking cases to trial at both the state and federal levels. Attempts to increase
funding for indigent defense by bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
have been thwarted by high procedural and substantive hurdles, and conse-
quently these attempts have failed to bring significant change. This Note ar-
gues that, because ineffective assistance of counsel litigation is most likely a
dead end for system-wide reform, indigent defenders should challenge the con-
stitutionality of underfunding based on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
speedy trial. Existing speedy trial jurisprudence suggests that the overworking
and furloughing of indigent-defense attorneys that delay bringing cases to trial
should be counted against the government when determining a speedy trial
violation. And in light of the standards for bringing a speedy trial claim, as-
serting a violation of speedy trial may actually place a lower burden on the
defendant than making an ineffective assistance claim. Finally, this Note con-
tends that, in systems with the most egregious delays, defender organizations
should seek structural injunctions mandating increased resource allocation to
protect the right to speedy trial.
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Introduction
The Sixth Amendment grants that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence[,]”1 rights that were extended to state-
court trials in Gideon v. Wainwright2 and Klopfer v. North Carolina.3 Today,
the majority of criminal defendants qualify for indigent representation,4
which means that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of counsel
largely turns on federal and local governments’ providing adequate re-
sources to indigent-defense systems.
This Note argues that significant underfunding of indigent-defense sys-
tems should be counted against the government for the purposes of deter-
mining whether defendants’ right to speedy trial has been violated. It also
contends that, in extreme cases, chronic underfunding may amount to a
systemic constitutional violation that must be remedied by judicial over-
sight. Sections I.A and I.B survey the status of federal and state indigent-
defense systems, emphasizing how a lack of resources leads to system-wide
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing appointed counsel at no charge to indigent state-
court defendants).
3. 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (guaranteeing right to a speedy trial to state-court defendants).
4. An estimated 90% of federal criminal defendants qualify for appointed counsel. Se-
questering Justice: How the Budget Crisis is Undermining Our Courts: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Bankruptcy and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 35 (2013)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Hon. Julia S. Gibbons, Chair, Committee on the Budget of
the Judicial Conference of the United States); see Appointment of Counsel, U.S. Courts, http://
www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/appointmentofcounsel.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (noting
that federally funded defenders “represent the vast majority of individuals” prosecuted in fed-
eral courts).
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delays in taking cases to trial. Section I.C explores the hurdles that plaintiffs
must clear in order to bring ineffective assistance claims, lays out how these
claims have failed to spur significant change in indigent defense, and con-
cludes that ineffective assistance of counsel litigation is a dead end for sys-
tem-wide reform. Part II then presents an alternative way to challenge the
constitutionality of underfunding indigent-defense systems. Specifically, it
asserts that indigent defenders should argue that the overworking and
furloughing of indigent-defense attorneys—and the resulting delays in
bringing cases to trial—violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of speedy
trial as described in Barker v. Wingo,5 Doggett v. United States,6 Vermont v.
Brillon,7 and the recent dissent to dismissal of Boyer v. Louisiana.8 Moreover,
in light of the standards set for bringing a speedy trial violation claim, Part
II also argues that asserting a violation of speedy trial places a lower burden
on the defendant than making a Strickland ineffective assistance claim. Fi-
nally, Part III contends that indigent defendants and their attorneys should
seek individual relief based on a violation of the right to speedy trial, and
this Part also maintains that the most overburdened defender systems
should seek structural injunctions mandating increased resource allocation
to ensure that the right to speedy trial is protected in the future. Ultimately,
this Note argues that the right to speedy trial is inextricably linked to pro-
viding adequate resources for indigent-defense systems, and that, when fail-
ure to provide funding for indigent defense denies a defendant the right to
speedy trial, the courts should dismiss the indictment and possibly enjoin
the appropriate government to provide funding in the future. Although this
Note focuses mainly on the federal defender and uses federal statistics, the
legal argument for holding the government accountable for delays resulting
from underfunding largely applies to underresourced state and local de-
fender organizations as well.9
I. The Current Structure of Indigent Defense and
Systemic Problems
Section I.A describes the history and structure of the federal indigent-
defense system and provides an analysis of the challenges it faces in the
twenty-first century, including the particular challenges posed by the 2013
sequester. Section I.B then gives an overview of state and local indigent-
defense systems and explains the chronic problems of underfunding and
overwork that these systems confront. Finally, Section I.C details how de-
fendants and indigent-defense providers themselves have tried and failed to
use ineffective assistance claims to reform indigent-defense systems in the
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
6. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
7. 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
8. 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013).
9. The exception being several federal-specific references to the federal Speedy Trial Act
and certain structural aspects of the modern federal-defender system.
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states, and how many legislatures have failed to address the crisis in indigent
defense on their own. This analysis will show that an innovative approach to
indigent-defense reform is necessary to protect the fundamental rights of
criminal defendants.
A. The Federal System
Congress provided for indigent defense through the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 and its subsequent amendments, which established the Federal De-
fender Office (“FDO”) and provided funding for Criminal Justice Act
“panel” attorneys (“CJAs”), who are private contract attorneys paid by the
hour.10 Federal district courts, under the supervision of the circuit courts,
are empowered to create a plan for their districts to provide counsel, investi-
gators, experts, and “other services necessary for adequate representation.”11
Today, federal indigent defendants are represented by a federal public de-
fender from the FDO, by a community defender from a nonprofit local
agency, or by a private CJA (in cases of conflict or overflow).12 Approxi-
mately 90% of all federal criminal defendants are indigent.13 Nationwide,
FDOs and local agencies take approximately 60% of their cases, while the
remainder goes to panel attorneys.14 The FDO has 80 offices covering 91 of
94 federal judicial districts,15 and it opened 138,039 new cases in 2013,16 a
caseload projected to increase in fiscal year (“FY”) 2014.17 The remaining
cases are handled by over 10,000 panel attorneys18 at an increased cost per
hour and, by general consensus, at decreased efficiency.19 When an FDO
cannot take a case, a CJA must be assigned to it,20 a process that the
10. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012)); Geoffrey Cheshire, A History of the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964, Fed. Law., Mar. 2013, at 46, 53; Donna Lee Elm & Richard S. Dellinger, Dismantling
Gideon’s Legacy: Sequestration’s Impact on Public Defender Services, Fed. Law., July 2013, at 11,
11.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2012).
12. Elm & Dellinger, supra note 10, at 11; U.S. Courts, supra note 4.
13. Hearing, supra note 4, at 35 (statement of Hon. Julia S. Gibbons).
14. U.S. Courts, supra note 4.
15. Id.
16. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 2013 Annual Report of the Director, tbl.S-21,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/tables/S21Sep13.pdf (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014).
17. Additionally, defense caseloads are driven entirely by prosecutorial policies rather
than by the capacity of defender services. Hearing, supra note 4, at 35 (statement of Hon. Julia
S. Gibbons).
18. See U.S. Courts, supra note 4.
19. Elm & Dellinger, supra note 10, at 12; Hearing, supra note 4, at 35 (statement of Hon.
Julia S. Gibbons).
20. See Elm & Dellinger, supra note 10, at 11–12. Defendants represented by panel attor-
neys are more likely to be found guilty and to receive longer sentences. Erwin Chemerinsky,
Lessons from Gideon, 122 Yale L.J. 2676, 2681 (2013).
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Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts believes will be delayed by budget
cuts.21
Historically, the federal-defender system was held in much higher re-
gard than state systems.22 The federal system’s superiority could stem from
its relatively robust funding (once provided by the Defender Services Office
of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), which gave defenders salary
parity with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, lower caseloads, more training, supe-
rior support staff, and better physical facilities.23 In 1997, one law professor
rejoiced that
[f]ederal defender budgetary requests are . . . depoliticized. They are based,
instead, on quantifiable data and demonstrated needs, and then included
with the budgetary requests for the entire judiciary. As the CJA Review
Committee concluded, the judiciary has been both creative and highly ef-
fective in advocating for federal defender offices.24
Yet despite the federal-defender system’s strong reputation relative to
that of state and local systems, it has always faced challenges. The U.S. De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”)’s Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 88%
of federal criminal defendants with indigent counsel who are found guilty
receive jail or prison sentences, while only 77% of federal criminal defend-
ants with private counsel who are found guilty receive jail or prison
sentences.25 In 2011, the median time it took to dispose of a federal criminal
21. Alison Matas, Furloughs Begin for Public Defenders, Balt. Sun (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:37
PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-public-defenders-se-
questration-20130403,0,27375.story.
22. See, e.g., Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent Representa-
tion, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 837, 838–39 (“[N]ot all defender programs are created equal,
and failing to make a distinction between a federal defender organization and [state] indigent
defense providers is a disservice to the analysis, as well as to the federal defender system, a
system that provides competent legal services which not only fulfill the noble promise of
Gideon, but surpass it.” (footnote omitted)).
23. Id. at 845, 856–66. Federal defenders have a caseload of approximately 100 cases at a
time, compared with up to 600 for local New York City defenders. Id. at 859–60. The caseload,
salary, training, support staff, and facilities led to federal defenders’ remaining in their posi-
tions as much as three times longer than their state counterparts in one New York location. Id.
at 856. Additionally, the circuit courts of appeals set the compensation of the federal public
defender for any given district; this compensation may not exceed the compensation of the
U.S. attorney for the same district. 7 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judici-
ary Policy § 420.10.30 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Appoint-
mentOfCounsel/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/vol7/Vol_
07A.pdf. Federal defender staff attorneys are paid on the Court Personnel System pay table—
the pay system of the U.S. Courts—at a level equivalent to the entry-level pay of a Department
of Justice attorney. See Eric Strauss, How Much Money Do Public Defenders Make?, Hous.
Chron., http://work.chron.com/much-money-public-defenders-make-11605.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014); Attorney Salaries, Promotions, and Benefits, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.
justice.gov/careers/legal/entry-salary.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). But nonpaying furloughs
have effectively, and dramatically, cut public-defender salaries. See infra text accompanying
note 29.
24. Parsons, supra note 22, at 849.
25. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2680–81.
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case by jury trial was 15.7 months.26 Although better resourced than state
systems, federal criminal defense appears significantly less effective than its
private counterparts, and the system as a whole takes staggeringly long times
to dispose of cases.
The 2013 sequester exacerbated these challenges. In FY 2013, the FDO
took a $52-million funding cut, more than 9% of its budget.27 It lost over
200 employees and operated at 90% of adequate staffing levels.28 Nation-
wide, between March and October, defenders took up to 20 days of fur-
loughs.29 Public defenders, private attorneys, congressmen, the attorney
general, and federal judges alike criticized the cuts for reducing the availabil-
ity of defender services, and they implied that the March-to-October cuts
may have been constitutionally invalid due to their denial of “effective
counsel.”30
Aside from effective-counsel concerns, there were subtler concerns
about resulting delays in the criminal justice system. Robert J. Anello, the
president of the federal bar, notes as follows:
The sequester has hindered the Second Circuit courts’ ability to efficiently
process criminal cases. . . .
. . . [F]urloughed attorneys have been forced to seek adjournments of pro-
ceedings—such as sentencings, plea allocutions, and suppression hear-
ings—in criminal cases. A several-month lag time can also occur between
the conclusion of a trial and the filing of the defendant’s motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. In the Southern and Eastern Districts,
these delays already have hampered the efficient resolution of criminal
cases.31
26. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the Director: Judi-
cial Business of the United States Courts 258, tbl.D-10, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf. This breakdown does
not distinguish between the length of time taken for indigent and nonindigent defendants to
go to trial, but since indigent defendants make up 90% of federal criminal defendants, see
supra note 4, these statistics are likely to accurately reflect the experiences of indigent
defendants.
27. Hearing, supra note 4, at 54 (statement of Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public
Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of the Federal Public and Community
Defenders).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id.
30. E.g., Hearing, supra note 4, at 54 (statement of Michael S. Nachmanoff); id. at 70
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); Eric H. Holder, Jr., Op-Ed, Defendants’ Legal Rights Under-
mined by Budget Cuts, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/eric-holder-defendants-legal-rights-undermined-by-budget-cuts/2013/08/22/
efccbec8-06bc-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html; Letter from Robert J. Anello, President,
Fed. Bar Council, to President Barack Obama et al., Regarding Adverse Effects of the Sequester
on Federal Courts in Second Circuit (July 27, 2013), available at http://legalnewsline.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/FBCsequesterletter.pdf; Letter from Loretta A. Preska, Chief Judge,
S.D.N.Y., et al., to Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Aug. 13, 2013), available at
http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chief-Judges-Letter-to-Joseph-Biden.pdf.
31. Letter from Robert J. Anello, President, Fed. Bar Council, to President Barack Obama
et al., supra note 30.
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Gregory M. Sleet, then the chief judge on Delaware’s federal district
court, expressed concern about the justice system’s ability to meet its “con-
stitutional obligation in the criminal context” in the face of funding cuts to
the FDO.32 Chief Judge Traxler, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, also voiced his fear that budget cuts
would slow criminal prosecutions and undermine constitutional guaran-
tees.33 Under the sequester, “[c]riminal prosecutions [were] delayed because
defender organizations do not have the staff necessary to continue their rep-
resentation of the defendant.”34 Recognizing that the federal-defender fur-
loughs crippled the ability of defenders to operate at full capacity, several
federal courts stopped hearing criminal matters on Fridays or alternate
Fridays.35 The longer the FDO operated at a reduced budget, the worse the
problem became: delays snowballed over time as federal defenders and
courts faced a larger and larger backlog of pending cases.36
Additionally, cuts to the FDO meant that more criminal cases were sent
to contract attorneys, causing further delay as defendants waited for the ap-
pointment of a new attorney.37 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
noted that funding cuts made the process of assigning private attorneys
slower than before the sequester and delayed payments to CJAs.38 Exacerbat-
ing this problem, the FDO kept furloughs down by delaying payments to
CJAs in FY 2013.39 The federal government stopped paying CJAs on
September 17, when FY 2013 funds ran out, and the government did
not acquire the funds needed to pay them until the October 17 Con-
tinuing Resolution ended the federal government shutdown.40 The
32. Sean O’Sullivan, Public Defenders Face “Crippling” Cuts, USA Today (July 23, 2013,
8:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/23/sequestration-public-de-
fenders-face-crippling-cuts/2577483/.
33. Chief Judge William B. Traxler, Jr., Statement on Impact of Sequestration on Judiciary,
Defender Funding, U.S. Courts (Apr. 17, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/statement-impact-
sequestration-judiciary-defender-funding (“[A] significant problem arises when budget cuts
impact our responsibilities under the Constitution. This happens when we cannot afford to
fulfill the Sixth Amendment right to representation for indigents . . . . The predictable result is
that criminal prosecutions will slow . . . .”).
34. Id.; see also Sam Stein & Ryan J. Reilly, Sequestration’s Biggest Victim: The Public
Defender System, Huffington Post (July 22, 2013, 6:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/07/22/sequestration-public-defender_n_3624111.html.
35. Preska et al., supra note 30, at 3.
36. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 70–71 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
37. Id. at 52 (statement of Michael S. Nachmanoff).
38. Matas, supra note 21.
39. Traxler, supra note 33.
40. See Statement of James R. Silkenat, President of the American Bar Association, Before
the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Forum 3–4 (Oct. 8, 2013), available at
http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ABA-Shutdown-Statement.pdf; Todd Ruger, Federal
Judiciary Budget Increases in Last-Minute Budget Deal, Blog LegalTimes (Oct. 16, 2013, 10:12
PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/10/federal-judiciary-budget-increases-in-last-
minute-budget-deal.html.
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Judicial Conference decreased panel attorney rates by $15 an hour for FY
2014.41
Prolonged funding issues raise questions about whether contract attor-
neys will be willing to take cases when payment for their time and case-
related costs is not forthcoming.42 Reduced compensation creates a disincen-
tive for attorneys to participate in the indigent-defense system. This disin-
centive leads to fewer attorneys willing to accept cases, which in turn
increases the caseload for the smaller pool of attorneys still open to taking
these cases, ultimately compounding the difficulties that criminal defense
attorneys already face in attempting effectively to represent clients.43 Contin-
ued funding delays, uncertainty about pay rates, and the general unreliability
of working in indigent defense will dry up the pool of attorneys needed to
take on forty percent of federal criminal cases.44
The defender system’s problems were ameliorated in small part by the
resolution that ended the 2013 shutdown.45 In that resolution, which funded
the government through January, the federal judiciary as a whole received a
budget increase of $51 million for the period through January 15, 2014,
although this funding did not make up for the $350 million that the judici-
ary lost in budget cuts earlier in 2013 as part of the sequester.46 Defender
services received $26 million of that funding increase,47 which spared them
the losses of up to 23% that they had been expecting.48 The funding increase
went “primarily” to back pay for CJAs, who were not paid between mid-
September and mid-October.49 A spokesman for Senator Coons of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and the Courts insisted that the
small increase would be sufficient to end furloughs of federal defenders
while admitting that the resolution did not “fully restore the Judiciary and
the defenders to the funding levels they need to fully execute their constitu-
tional mission.”50
The federal-defender system is still operating with less money than it
needs in order to fulfill its constitutional mandate,51 and the sequester and
the near-shutdown of the judiciary have revealed that the indigent-defense
41. Silkenat, supra note 40, at 7–8.
42. Id. at 3–4.
43. Am. Bar Ass’n, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for
Equal Justice 7 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis-
trative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_pro-
ceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.
44. See supra text accompanying note 14.
45. See Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, 127 Stat. 558 (2013)
(ending the 2013 government shutdown).
46. Ruger, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. Hearing, supra note 4, at 70 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); Stein & Reilly, supra
note 34.
49. See Ruger, supra note 40.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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budget is no longer immune from partisanship. Robust financial support led
the system to become a beacon of relative excellence, but lack of support
from March to October 2013 undermined the quality of the system. There is
no way to give back to defendants the time they spent in jail while their
lawyers were furloughed. And given current congressional partisanship,52
there is no guarantee that the system—and Sixth Amendment liberties—will
not suffer likewise in the near future.
B. State and Local Systems
States and localities provide indigent defense through a combination of
public defender offices, “an assigned counsel system in which the court
schedules cases for participating private attorneys,” and “a contract system
in which private attorneys contractually agree to take on a specified number
of indigent defendants or indigent defense cases.”53 Twenty-two states have
state-based public defender offices, 27 states and the District of Columbia
have county-based public defender offices, and Maine, an outlier, lacks a
public defender office.54 Across the states and the District of Columbia,
15,026 attorneys handled 5,572,450 cases in 2007.55
Though states and localities provide indigent-defense counsel in a wide
variety of ways, their services are considered largely inadequate: “[e]veryone
knows that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of training plague
indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states, such that the prom-
ise of Gideon v. Wainwright is largely unfulfilled.”56 Only “[f]ifteen state
public defender programs had caseload or workload limits, the authority to
refuse cases, or both.”57 DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics calculated that 15
out of 19 reporting state programs exceeded the maximum recommended
limit of cases per attorney—an estimate that was admittedly low.58 That data
show that, on average, state and local public defenders are carrying an 80%
52. See generally Drew DeSilver, Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among Public, Is
Greater Than Ever, Pew Research Center (July 17, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-ever/.
53. Lynn Langton & Donald Farole, Jr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Public Defender
Programs, 2007, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf. The
American Bar Association has put together a map detailing which states use which system.
Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 43, at 5 chart 1.
54. Langton & Farole, supra note 53, at 3 tbl.1.
55. Id. For an explanation of how part-time attorneys factor into this total, see id. at 21.
56. Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Ade-
quacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013).
57. Langton & Farole, supra note 53, at 12.
58. Id. at 12–13 (“The National Advisory Commission . . . guidelines recommend a
caseload for each public defender’s office . . . . [T]he caseload of a public defender office
should not exceed the following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than 150; misde-
meanors . . . per attorney per year: not more than 400 . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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higher caseload than they should.59 And this is only an average: at the ex-
tremes, “[p]ublic defenders routinely handle well over 1,000 cases a year,
more than three times the number of cases that the American Bar Associa-
tion [“ABA”] says one attorney can handle effectively. As a result, many de-
fendants sit in jail for months before even speaking to their court-appointed
lawyers.”60 Public defenders already lack adequate compensation (particu-
larly contract attorneys with maximum fees for each case), support services
(including investigative and expert services), and training, and they are often
subject to drastic budget cuts in the face of state fiscal crises.61
“[L]ack of current and reliable data” is “a significant barrier” to evaluat-
ing structural deficiencies of various kinds within the indigent-defense sys-
tem.62 Most state courts do not distinguish between cases that go to trial and
cases that are resolved by other means, which makes it difficult to compile a
state median filing-to-disposition time for crimes that go to trial.63 But older
and jurisdiction-specific data clearly demonstrate that a lack of resources has
produced long delays in many state criminal justice systems: a 1991 study of
39 urban courts found that, in 1987, the median time from arrest to judg-
ment for felony cases taken to a jury trial was 209 days; the median time
from arrest to judgment for felony cases resolved in any way (a plea, a bench
trial, dismissal, and so forth) was 131 days.64 In places like Brooklyn, the
average time until trial was an appalling 15 months.65
59. Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing the Indigent Defense System, Am. Const. Soc’y for L.
& Pol’y 15 (Jan. 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Hashimoto_-_Assessing_the_
Indigent_Defense_System.pdf.
60. Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis,
Am. Const. Soc’y for L. & Pol’y 1 (Sept. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Primus%20-%20
Litigation%20Strategies.pdf (emphasis added).
61. Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 43, at 7.
62. Id. at 28.
63. See Lindsey Devers, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Plea and Charge Bargaining 1
(2011), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf
(“[T]here are no exact estimates of the proportion of cases that are resolved through plea
bargaining.”). When contacted for information on statistics regarding how long it takes for a
criminal defendant who chooses trial actually to reach trial, California’s Administrative Office
of the Courts stated as follows: “The requested information is not information we typically
maintain. . . . You may wish to contact individual Superior Courts to request the data from
them, however, we think that it is unlikely that individual courts track the type of detailed
information that you are requesting.” E-mail from the Judicial and Court Operations Services
Division of California to author (Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with the editors).
64. John A. Goerdt with Chris Lomvardias & Geoff Gallas, Nat’l Ctr. for State
Courts, Reexamining the Pace of Litigation in 39 Urban Trial Courts 7 fig.2.2 (1991),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/134609NCJRS.pdf. A more recent
DOJ report calculated that, in state courts, “[t]he median time from arrest to sentencing for all
felony convictions was 265 days.” Sean Rosenmerkel et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony
Sentences in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables 24 (2009), available at http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. Neither report contains a specific statistic for the median
time to disposition for cases going to trial.
65. Goerdt et al., supra note 64, at 9 tbl.2.3. Of the 39 urban areas, Hartford (376
days), the Bronx (412 days), Newark (444 days), and Brooklyn (445 days) took over a year to
reach disposition by jury verdict in a felony case. Id.
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The problem has not improved since 1987. A more recent ABA report
detailed crises in specific jurisdictions, finding complete suspension of most
prosecutions for 3 months at a time,66 detention for up to 11 months with-
out seeing a lawyer,67 and averages of 501 days for a case to reach disposition
of any kind.68 “Aside from the potential violations of the right to a speedy
trial, these delays disproportionately harm poor persons who, because they
are unable to post bond, endure repeated delays while they remain locked up
in jail.”69
Although the data on cases disposed of by trial are old or unavailable
nationwide, the information that is available demonstrates that there are sig-
nificant portions of the country where it takes a very long time for cases to
be disposed of—and where it takes even longer for cases to go to trial. Inad-
equate resources for prosecutors and courts may explain these delays, but,
based on the ABA’s witness reports described above, the problem is more
likely due to lack of indigent-defense manpower.70 At least anecdotally, there
are jurisdictions where budget cuts to indigent defense are directly responsi-
ble for postponing trials (e.g., Oregon), and there are other jurisdictions
where it takes months to appoint indigent-defense attorneys, a delay that
prevents these attorneys from promptly visiting their clients (e.g., Missis-
sippi and Louisiana).71
The lack of resources provided for indigent defense is delaying the crim-
inal process. And while the federal-defender system may be heading toward
a crisis, many state and local indigent-defender systems have been exper-
iencing a full-blown crisis for years. People are languishing in prisons while
awaiting trial, which converts the paradigm from “innocent until proven
66. Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 43, at 11 (“In Oregon, due to drastic cuts in
the indigent defense budget, only the most serious and violent crimes were prosecuted during
the last three months of fiscal year 2003; all remaining cases were postponed until the next
fiscal year . . . . [P]robably between 15,000 to 20,000 individual citizens [were affected].”
(citation omitted)).
67. “[I]n some places throughout the country, poor persons accused of crime are ar-
rested and detained in local jails for months or even years before they have a chance to speak
with a lawyer.” Id. at 23. One Mississippi woman “was in jail for eleven months before a lawyer
was appointed, was in jail two additional months before the lawyer came to see her, and was in
jail one more month” while her case was resolved. Id. In another Mississippi case, “a woman
arrested for stealing $200 from a casino slot machine spent eight months in jail because she
was unable to afford bail. Eventually, without receiving any effective legal representation, the
woman pled guilty to time served simply to get out of jail.” Id. “[A]lthough Louisiana by
statute requires the appointment of public defenders at a hearing to be held within seventy-
two hours of arrest, in Calcasieu Parish public defenders rarely meet with clients in felony
cases prior to arraignment, which occurs an average of 315 days after arrest.” Id. at 18. In the
same jurisdiction, it takes an average of 501 days from arrest to disposition of any kind, not
only disposition by jury trial. Id. at 26–27.
68. Id. at 26–27 (reporting average delays in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana).
69. Id. at 27.
70. See supra notes 66–68 (suggesting that delays were caused by cuts to indigent defense
and the unavailability of public defenders to meet with clients).
71. See supra notes 66–68.
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guilty” to “innocent until pleading guilty just to get out of jail.” As a result,
lack of funding for indigent defense is undermining the foundational as-
sumptions of the American criminal justice system.
C. Failed Attempts to Correct Problems in Indigent Defense
This Section argues that legal challenges to underfunding based on inef-
fective assistance claims have not and will not rectify the underfunding
problems in indigent defense. It also contends that the legislature likewise
cannot be relied on to ensure effective indigent defense.
1. Legal Efforts Rooted in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine
Given the sorry state of indigent defense across the country, there have
been attempts to challenge the constitutional inadequacy of entire public-
defender systems. Between 1980 and 2000, numerous suits were brought (by
defendants and even by public defenders themselves!) in state and lower
federal courts alleging that certain state-operated defender systems were so
inadequate that they violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.72 These
suits have “generated little actual change in the delivery of indigent defense
services nationwide” since courts have found that “systemic problems of in-
effectiveness,” absent previous actual or constructive denial of counsel, are
not cognizable claims.73 In addition to courts’ finding system-wide claims
generally not cognizable, the abstention and standing doctrines would also
prevent challenges on the grounds of underfunding: “If the suit were
brought on behalf of those in the midst of a state prosecution, the federal
court would have to abstain under Younger v. Harris. But if a suit were
72. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2687–88; Martin Guggenheim, The People’s Right to a
Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 395, 406 n.41 (2012)
(listing fifteen such cases).
73. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2697–98; Primus, supra note 60, at 4 & n.21; see also
Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of
Budgetary Crisis, 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 341, 368–81 (discussing cases in Florida, Kentucky,
Michigan, and New York). It should be emphasized here that the rights to speedy trial and
assistance of counsel are contained in entirely separate clauses of the Sixth Amendment. U.S.
Const. amend. VI. The courts generally consider these two issues separately. E.g.,
United States v. Lagasse, 269 F. App’x 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment speedy trial claim but dismissing without prejudice an ineffective assistance claim
because the “facts relevant to the ineffectiveness claim are best developed in collateral habeas
proceedings”). In several cases—most of which are unpublished—federal courts of appeals
and at least one state supreme court have ruled that counsel’s failure to pursue a speedy trial
claim does not render counsel’s performance per se ineffective. E.g., Dillard v. Sec’y, DOC, 440
F. App’x 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Williamson, 319 F. App’x
734, 737 (10th Cir. 2009); Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2008);
Gorman v. Goord, 154 F. App’x 267, 271–72 (2d Cir. 2005); Salyer v. Sternes, 34 F. App’x 238,
240–41 (7th Cir. 2002); Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 854 (5th Cir. 1993); State v. Lewis,
151 P.3d 883 (Mont. 2007). It is clear from these rulings that courts do not consider the lack of
speedy trial to be a systemic problem of ineffectiveness. Rather, they consider the rights to
speedy trial and effective assistance of counsel to be unique rights afforded to criminal
defendants.
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brought by those who are not being prosecuted, there would be a serious
issue concerning standing and ripeness.”74
Additionally, those individuals who have overcome the abstention hur-
dle and brought ineffective assistance claims have fared poorly in court. De-
fendants facing imprisonment are nominally entitled to effective assistance
of counsel.75 But the bar for “reasonably effective assistance” is easily met
given Strickland v. Washington’s rule that “[t]he benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”76 To meet this benchmark, a
defendant must satisfy two prongs: first, he must show that counsel’s per-
formance did not meet an “objective standard of reasonableness,” and sec-
ond, he must show that there was a “reasonable probability” that “the result
of the proceeding would have been different” if not for the unreasonably
poor performance.77 Professor Chemerinsky calls Strickland “usually an in-
surmountable burden,” noting that there have been only two cases since
Strickland in which the Supreme Court found sufficient prejudice to over-
turn a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel (both of
which turned on inadequate investigation in capital cases).78 Simply stated,
the “Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent defen-
dant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy.”79 In addi-
tion to Strickland’s high threshold, the Younger abstention doctrine also
inhibits individual appeals on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, as
it prevents defendants from seeking relief until state criminal proceedings
have been completed.80
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2697 (footnote omitted); see also Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts may not grant declaratory relief based on the
validity of the statute when the case is pending in state court). The practical effect of Younger is
that a defendant on direct appeal in a state court cannot bring a federal habeas action until the
direct appeals are concluded. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2687, 2692–93; Primus, supra
note 60, at 4–5.
75. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
76. 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (holding that (1) the proper standard for attorney per-
formance is that of reasonably effective assistance; (2) defense counsel’s strategy at sentencing
hearing was reasonable and, thus, the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel;
and (3) even assuming counsel’s challenged conduct was unreasonable, defendant suffered
insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence).
77. Id. at 688, 694.
78. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2689 (referencing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 274
(2005) and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)).
79. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974)). The Supreme Court has established some baselines. Id. at 84 (holding that, when a
defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor at
trial, due process requires that the state provide a psychiatrist if the defendant cannot afford
one). But Strickland sets the bar low for assistance of counsel.
80. Primus, supra note 60, at 4–5.
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Indigent-defense systems are in crisis across the country, and ineffective
assistance of counsel litigation has failed to provide more resources to indi-
gent defenders. But the Supreme Court has recognized that speedy trial vio-
lations resulting from breakdowns of indigent-defender systems may be a
basis for overturning convictions.81 Given the onerous requirements of inef-
fective assistance claims, indigent defendants whose cases took a long time to
reach trial may find it more feasible to make speedy trial claims instead.
2. Legislative Efforts to Correct Problems in Indigent Defense
Ideally, the Judicial Conference could rely on Congress to provide fund-
ing to stave off a breakdown of the indigent-defense system.82 Indeed,
through the 1960s and 1970s, Congress went above and beyond its constitu-
tional obligations in writing legislative protections for Sixth Amendment
guarantees.83 But current partisan gridlock suggests that, even after the Oc-
tober 2013 boost to the defender budget, relying on Congress is not the best
long-term plan to ensure the stability of indigent defense.84
Congress was once in the vanguard of protecting the right to counsel
and the right to speedy trial. For example, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
crystalized time limits for speedy trial in a way that the Supreme Court’s
decisions had not.85 And the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 created an indi-
gent-defense system that was the envy of underresourced state and local de-
fender organizations across the country,86 and that system ultimately
81. See infra Sections II.A–B.
82. But see Traxler, supra note 33, for a discussion of why the courts cannot rely on
Congress.
83. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 27–52.
85. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–64
(2012)). Only two years after the Court first refused to set a firm limit on speedy trial, see
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972), Congress went beyond the Court’s require-
ments and set its own statutory limitations on speedy trial, recognizing that a defendant who
waits long periods before trial suffers from a “magnitude of disabilities,” including difficulties
defending himself at trial, severe emotional strain, and financial hardship. United States v.
Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1980). A “dissatisfied” Congress passed the Speedy
Trial Act to “circumvent the Barker opinion and put teeth into the speedy trial guarantee” as
well as to protect the societal interest in speedy trials. Id.; Brian P. Brooks, Comment, A New
Speedy Trial Standard for Barker v. Wingo: Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an Age of
Statutes, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 587, 602–03 (1994). Although there are so many provisions for
tolling time requirements in the Act that it does not uniformly keep prosecutions within its
hundred-day limit (see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)–(B) for an extensive list of reasons a judge
may toll the speedy trial time limit when “the ends of justice” are served by granting a contin-
uance), the Act nevertheless demonstrates Congress’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s refusal to
set a firm deadline for speedy trial violations. See Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d at 769.
86. Although the Criminal Justice Act was passed a year after the Court handed down its
ruling in Gideon, support for a public defender system had been growing in both the legislative
and executive branches since 1949. See generally Cheshire, supra note 10. For example, in 1960,
Congress passed the District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, “foreshadowing future national legis-
lation”; and in 1961, Attorney General Kennedy appointed the committee whose language and
recommendations were incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act. Id. at 51–52. After the
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provided greater protections to defendants than the Supreme Court juris-
prudence at the time required.87 In light of this history, the simplest way to
address the deficiencies in the judicial budgets would be for Congress to
revive its principled stance on providing adequate counsel and speedy tri-
als—a stance that prompted it to pass the Criminal Justice Act and the
Speedy Trial Act in the first place. As part of recommitting itself to safe-
guarding these rights, Congress could restore funding to the federal-de-
fender system without the need for judicial intervention.
Yet given the gridlock that ultimately led to the sequester and the Octo-
ber 2013 federal government shutdown, Congress should not be relied on to
restore the federal-defender system to its former glory. There is no guaran-
tee that the next budget will be equally generous to the federal-defender
system or that Congress will avoid a second shutdown.88 Accordingly, while
Congress should continue to legislate in ways that uphold the Sixth Amend-
ment, it is not necessarily interested in protecting trial rights in the current
political climate, and it cannot necessarily be relied on to fund adequately
indigent-defense institutions.89
For their parts, many states have never enjoyed the support for indigent
defense that the federal system had throughout the 1960s and 1970s.90 As a
result, defendants in states with systemically deficient indigent-defense sys-
tems should not expect a dramatic funding increase in the near future.
The Sixth Amendment creates fundamental guarantees—rights that
cannot be left to the whims of dysfunctional legislatures that have proven
they can turn a blind eye to indigent-defense crises for months or years on
House passed the Act in 1964, its longtime champion Senator Hruska urged passage in the
Senate, triumphantly proclaiming as follows:
The case for this legislation is easy to state: we are a nation dedicated to the precept of
equal justice for all. Experience has abundantly demonstrated that, if the rule of law will
hold out more than an illusion of justice for the indigent, we must have the means to
insure adequate representation that the bill before us provides.
Id. at 53 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 18,521–22 (1964)). The modern federal-defender system
was not established to achieve grudging compliance with Gideon: it was the thoughtful prod-
uct, decades in the making, of the executive’s and legislature’s understanding that “justice for
all” required a professionalized indigent-defense system.
87. See Parsons, supra note 22, at 838–39.
88. At least one district court judge did not view the October Continuing Resolution as
an indication of positive things to come. Judge Kopf of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska responded to news that the shutdown had ended by blogging T.S. Eliot’s “The
Hollow Men.” Richard George Kopf, The Shut Down Is Over, So Why Am I Depressed?, Hercu-
les & Umpire (Oct. 17, 2013), http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/10/17/the-shut-down-
is-over-so-why-i-am-depressed/ (“This is the way the world ends / Not with a bang but a
whimper.”).
89. Professor Primus, in a 2010 issue brief, proposed creating a federal enforcement ac-
tion allowing DOJ or a deputized private party to seek equitable relief in federal courts for
violations of Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. But Primus herself recognizes that DOJ
has limited resources—a fact underscored by the sequester and shutdown, which forced the
department to halt numerous civil proceedings. Primus, supra note 60, at 2, 8.
90. See supra Section I.B.
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end. Since indigent defendants can rely on neither ineffective assistance doc-
trine nor legislatures to rehabilitate indigent-defense systems, they should
look to alternative tools for challenging the systemic lack of resources.
II. Speedy Trial May Be Used to Challenge Funding Cuts to
Indigent Defense
Supreme Court and appellate court precedent suggest that the break-
down in indigent defense resulting from a lack of funding should count
against the government for purposes of speedy trial. Section II.A lays out the
Court’s test for speedy trial violations and then contextualizes the dicta that
indicate that breakdowns in indigent-defense systems resulting from un-
derfunding should contribute to a finding that a defendant’s right to speedy
trial has been violated. Section II.B argues that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent to
the dismissal of certiorari in Boyer v. Louisiana represents a natural extrapo-
lation of Court precedent. This Section also contends that delays caused by
state or federal governments’ lack of funding for indigent defense should be
counted against the government for purposes of determining whether the
right to speedy trial has been violated. Finally, Section II.C explains how
indigent defendants should make an argument that budget cuts violated
their right to speedy trial, and this Section then elaborates on the advantages
of such an argument over a Strickland ineffective assistance claim.
A. Speedy Trial Jurisprudence Suggests That Funding-Related Delays
Should Count Against the Government for Purposes of
Finding Speedy Trial Violations
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to speedy trial, and courts
typically count administrative delays against the government for purposes of
assessing when that right has been violated. The body of law on speedy trial
was fairly limited until the mid-1960s,91 when the Supreme Court in United
States v. Ewell92 discussed the right itself and in Klopfer v. North Carolina
declared the right just as fundamental as the rights to counsel and trial by
jury.93 Then in Barker v. Wingo, the Court, warning that the speedy trial
right is “amorphous,” “slippery,” and “necessarily relative,”94 rejected a fixed
time period for determining a violation of speedy trial and adopted instead a
flexible “balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
91. Supreme Court Review—Speedy Trial, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 543, 543 n.6
(1977). Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905), dealt with particular circumstances surround-
ing the case, and Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957), held that delay could not be
purposeful.
92. 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (finding that, in the particular circumstances of the case, a
nineteen-month interval between defendants’ arrest and a subsequent indictment did not vio-
late the speedy trial right).
93. 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (extending the fundamental right of speedy trial to the
states).
94. 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (quoting Beavers, 198 U.S. at 87).
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the defendant are weighed” on an ad hoc basis.95 Rather than focusing only
on a set length of time, a proper balancing test was required to include (1)
the length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of
his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.96 No single factor is necessary
or sufficient for finding a deprivation of speedy trial, and other circum-
stances may still be relevant.97 And yet court rulings since Barker show that
the test may effectively be used to challenge many of the delays common to
indigent criminal cases.
The first Barker factor is “length of delay.” When the delay is long
enough, it becomes “presumptively prejudicial”; at this presumptively preju-
dicial point, the delay triggers full application of the other Barker factors.98
Consistent with its rejection of a set number of months for speedy trial, the
Supreme Court has never specified a point at which postaccusation delay
becomes presumptively prejudicial, and it has held that “the delay that can
be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a seri-
ous, complex conspiracy charge.”99 In Doggett v. United States, however, the
Court observed in a footnote that
[d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally
found postaccusation delay “presumptively prejudicial” as it approaches
one year. . . . We note that, as the term is used in this threshold context,
“presumptive prejudice” does not necessarily indicate a statistical
probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem
the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.100
95. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
96. Id. The Second and Tenth Circuits and some district courts recognize “federal-state
comity” as a fifth Barker factor, but they regard it as a secondary factor relative to the first four
and significant only in the context of “considering whether undue delay excuses a failure to
exhaust” state remedies before applying for a writ of habeas corpus. Roberites v. Colly, 546 F.
App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2013); see also, e.g., Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1553–57 (10th
Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Duckworth, 844 F. Supp. 460, 462–63 (N.D. Ind. 1994). The remaining
courts treat comity as a general requirement for habeas relief rather than describing it as a fifth
Barker factor. E.g., Johnson v. Roberts, No. 96-60153, 1996 WL 405773 (5th Cir. July 1, 1996)
(per curiam). For examples of federal courts considering whether the Speedy Trial Act has
been violated, see infra text accompanying notes 129–131.
97. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
98. Id. at 530.
99. Id. at 531. Yet many simple street crimes that go to trial have median filing-to-jury-
trial times greater than a year in federal courts. In 2011, the median filing-to-jury-trial time
for assault was 12.9 months and for drug offenses was 17.0 months. Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, supra note 26, at 258–59 tbl.D-10. For state filing-to-jury-trial times, see supra
notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
100. 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (citations omitted). The pretrial delay in Doggett was
eight-and-a-half years, id. at 648, which is admittedly much longer than the delays attributable
to recent spending cuts. But the fact that the Court approvingly made reference to the one-
year mark in such an extreme case appears to indicate a broader concern that encompasses
shorter delays for simple street crimes, particularly when the delay in those cases is not, in the
Court’s words, “both inevitable and wholly justifiable.” Id. at 656.
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The second Barker factor assesses the government’s reason for delay,
with different reasons assigned different weights. Deliberate delay by the
prosecution weighs heavily against the government, while a “valid reason,
such as a missing witness[,]” may justify the delay.101 Significantly for pur-
poses of analyzing the sequester, a “more neutral reason such as . . . over-
crowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest
with the government rather than with the defendant.”102 In other words,
although delays resulting from administrative issues are not weighted as
heavily as intentional prosecutorial foot dragging, unintentional government
delays are still counted against the government for purposes of determining
speedy trial violations. Under this clear guideline, any court congestion re-
sulting from underfunding weighs against the government in assessing
speedy trial violations, even if it does not weigh as heavily as deliberate
prosecutorial delay.
Since Barker, the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that systemic
issues in public-defender agencies may be imputed to the state. In Polk
County v. Dodson, for example, the Court noted that a defender system’s
“hiring and firing decisions” are considered made on behalf of the state.103
Likewise, in Brillon v. Vermont, the Court stated that delays resulting from “a
systemic ‘breakdown of the public defender system’ ” may still be counted
against the state.104
Additionally, federal circuit courts and state supreme courts have largely
applied Barker in counting breakdowns in an appellate system against the
state.105 Courts have deemed inadequate an array of justifications for delays
in the appellate process, including delays due to multiple substitutions of
public defenders;106 lack of effective supervision of indigent counsel during
the appellate process;107 lack of funding or mismanagement of resources;108
101. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
102. Id.
103. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324–25 (1981) (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980)).
104. Brillon v. Vermont, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009). Like the factual scenario in Boyer v.
Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013), the facts in Brillon are critical to understanding the majority
opinion. The indigent defendant went through six court-appointed attorneys in the three years
between arrest and trial: he fired one county public defender, a second attorney conflicted off
the case immediately, a third court-appointed attorney withdrew after Brillon threatened his
life, and the fourth and fifth were contract attorneys who withdrew following modifications of
their contract with Vermont’s defender general. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1287–89. The defender
general required legislative approval to appropriate funds specifically to hire Brillon’s sixth
attorney, who took the case to trial and made the speedy trial violation argument. Id. at 1289.
105. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. at 18–23, Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283
(No. 08-88), 2008 WL 5417434 (discussing twelve cases from both federal and state appellate
courts, all finding ineffective assistance of counsel in the appellate process).
106. United States v. Brown, 292 F. App’x 250, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1989).
107. Brooks, 875 F.2d at 31.
108. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1546 (10th Cir. 1994).
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the inability of an indigent defender to provide “professional attention” to
an appeal in light of her heavy caseload commitments;109 and understaffing
of the appellate defender’s office.110 Delays as short as eighteen months to
appoint counsel have been counted against the state in determining speedy
trial violations.111 Where a defendant’s appeal “slipped through the cracks”
of the state-funded indigent-appellate-defender system, “[r]esponsibility for
this delay cannot be charged” against a defendant.112 Although nonsystemic
delays that occur after an attorney is assigned, such as those resulting from
the defense’s voluminous motions practice, are counted against the defen-
dant,113 delays that cannot reasonably be imputed to the defendant and his
legal strategy are instead counted against the state. As the text of the Sixth
Amendment makes plain, the right to speedy trial is a trial right;114 by con-
trast, most circuit courts consider the right to an appeal free of undue delay
a due process right.115 Nevertheless, these appellate cases all applied the
Barker factors when judging undue delay at the appellate level.116
The third Barker factor is assertion of the right to speedy trial.117 The
assertion-as-a-factor construction was intended to allow for judicial discre-
tion based on the circumstances of the particular situation, including appli-
cable procedural rules. This construction “would permit, for example, a
court to attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant
knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in
long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in
which no counsel is appointed.”118 By contrast, the Court has noted that, “if
109. United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
110. Gaines v. Manson, 481 A.2d 1084, 1095 (Conn. 1984).
111. State v. Bussart-Savaloja, 198 P.3d 163, 168 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (“Reasons such as
lack of funding, briefing delay by court-appointed attorneys, and mismanagement of resources
by public defender offices are not considered acceptable excuses for inordinate delay.”).
112. Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1169–70 (3d Cir. 1995).
113. Delay caused by court-appointed attorneys, once they are assigned, count against the
defendant rather than the state; although public defenders are part of the criminal justice
system, they act on behalf of the defendant rather than the state. Brillon v. Vermont, 129 S. Ct.
1283, 1287 (2009). As with private attorneys, public defenders’ strategic actions are imputed to
their clients after assignment. Id. at 1291.
114. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . .” (emphasis added)).
115. E.g., Simmons, 44 F.3d at 1169 & n.6. “The Supreme Court has not explicitly recog-
nized a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy appeal,” but the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits agree that the Due Process Clause guarantees a “reasonably
speedy appeal” on an appeal as of right, and the Seventh Circuit has assumed that “excessive”
delay in the appellate process may violate due process. Id.
116. United States v. Brown, 292 F. App’x 250, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
Simmons, 44 F.3d at 1169; Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1546 (10th Cir. 1994); Brooks v.
Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F.
2006); Gaines v. Manson, 481 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Conn. 1984); Bussart-Savaloja, 198 P.3d at
168.
117. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
118. Id. at 528–29 (emphasis added).
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delay is attributable to the defendant,” the defendant is considered to have
waived the right.119
The fourth and final Barker factor is prejudice to the defendant.120 The
Barker Court announced that prejudice should be assessed in light of the
interests that speedy trial is intended to protect: (1) preventing oppressive
pretrial incarceration, (2) minimizing the accused’s anxiety and concern,
and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.121 The
clock begins running against the government after “arrest, indictment, or
other official accusation”122 triggers it.
In Doggett, the government argued that the defendant had made no “af-
firmative showing that the delay weakened his ability to raise specific de-
fenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence,” and
the Supreme Court agreed that he “did indeed come up short in this re-
spect.”123 Nevertheless, the Court went on to state that “affirmative proof of
particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.”124 “[W]e
generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises
the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that
matter, identify.”125
Since Doggett, the federal circuit courts have split on the application of
Barker. Some federal circuits give equal weight to the four Barker factors126
and will find a presumption of prejudice even where a defendant does not
offer particularized proof that the delay has prejudiced his case in chief.127
119. Id. at 529.
120. Id. at 530.
121. Id. at 532. This definition of prejudice must be distinguished from the length-of-
delay factor needed to start the Barker inquiry—a factor that is purely time based. See supra
notes 98–100 and accompanying text. It is also distinguishable from the actual prejudice re-
quirement of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), because some federal circuit
courts may not require an actual showing of prejudice in the speedy trial context. See infra
notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
122. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992); see also Dillingham v.
United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam) (holding speedy trial clock triggered by
arrest); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (holding speedy trial clock triggered
by indictment).
123. 505 U.S. at 655.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Brooks, supra note 85, at 592.
127. E.g., United States v. Flowers, 476 F. App’x 55, 61, 64 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that
being incarcerated for 902 days before trial on a “straightforward” crime created a presump-
tion of prejudice and that anxiety and health problems caused by the delay constituted actual
prejudice without defendant showing that his defense had been impaired by the delay); United
States v. Mensah-Yawson, 489 F. App’x 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that federal courts
must recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways
that neither party can prove or identify and that this presumption becomes stronger as a delay
lengthens); United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We now hold that
prejudice will be presumed when there is a forty-five-month delay in bringing a defendant to
trial, even when it could be argued that only thirty-five months of that delay is attributable to
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The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, persist in requiring a particu-
larized demonstration of actual prejudice to the defendant’s case, unless the
first three factors “weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor.”128
In addition to using the Barker factors, federal courts also take a defer-
ential view of the timelines laid out in the Speedy Trial Act. “[T]he Speedy
Trial Act was . . . intended by Congress to give effect” to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to speedy trial and, “[a]s the Congressional view of what suffices
to satisfy the Constitution, the Act is entitled to much deference.”129 Al-
though the Act is riddled with loopholes that prevent it from setting a uni-
versally applicable deadline for all criminal trials or from being an effective
guarantor of speedy trial on its own,130 circuit court deference to the Act131
the Government. After such a long delay, witnesses become harder to locate and their memo-
ries inevitably fade. As Doggett recognized, the Government may attempt to rebut this pre-
sumption. However, here, as in Doggett, it has not affirmatively proved that the delay left
Battis’s ability to defend himself unimpaired.”); United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 764
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding that an eight-year delay between indictment and arrest created an
unrebutted presumption of prejudice and that the defendant’s speedy trial right had been
violated).
128. E.g., United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 432–33 (5th Cir. 2009) (“If ‘the first three
factors weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor,’ prejudice may be presumed . . . . If they do not,
the defendant ‘must demonstrate actual prejudice.’  . . . Harris contends that, as a result of the
pretrial delay, he lost his opportunity to present his mother as a witness at his trial, because
she died twenty months after the indictment. He claims that his mother ‘could have supported
defense assertions of innocence at trial.’ This blanket statement gives no indication as to the
content and relevance of the lost testimony, and how its absence impaired Harris’s defense;
nor does Harris explain why he or his attorneys failed to take any steps to preserve this testi-
mony for trial . . . . . Therefore, Harris has not shown ‘actual prejudice,’ and we reject his
claim of a Sixth Amendment violation.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Harris,
376 F.3d 1282, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2004); Brooks, supra note 85, at 604 n.94.
129. United States v. Horton, 705 F.2d 1414, 1416 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is perhaps
conceivable that an occasional extreme case may arise in which the Act is satisfied but not the
Constitution . . . .”); see also United States v. Fox, 788 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[The
Speedy Trial Act] gives effect to, but does not entirely displace, the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial.”); United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1459–60 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The Act was
intended to clarify the rights of defendants and to ensure that criminals are brought to justice
promptly.”); United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 360 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t will be an unu-
sual case in which the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been met but the sixth amend-
ment right to speedy trial has been violated.”).
130. The following reasons for delay, among others, do not count in computing time
constraints on speedy trial: delay for examinations; delay resulting from trials against the de-
fendant on other charges; delay resulting from interlocutory appeal; delay resulting from pre-
trial motion; delay resulting from proceedings to transfer a case to another district; delay
resulting from transportation; delay resulting from the court’s considering plea deals; any de-
lay resulting from absence or unavailability of witnesses; any delay resulting from defendant’s
being mentally or physically unable to stand trial; any “reasonable” delay related to joining
codefendants; and any delay resulting from the judge’s granting the government’s attorney a
continuance “on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice” are served by such a continu-
ance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012). The exemption for continuances is particularly important
for the instant issue.
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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indicates that the exceptions it provides for not meeting deadlines should be
considered in a Barker analysis.
B. Boyer v. Louisiana Presented a Possible Extension of
Established Speedy Trial Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court in Boyer seemed poised to decide a speedy trial
question based on delay caused by a lack of indigent-defense funding.132 In
granting certiorari, the Court relied on the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s con-
clusion that a “lack of funding” for the defense caused the “majority of the
seven-year delay.”133 Accordingly, it granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a
state’s failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years, partic-
ularly where failure was a direct result of the prosecution’s choice to seek the
death penalty, should be weighed against the state for speedy trial pur-
poses.”134 But in April 2013, the Court, per curiam, dismissed certiorari as
improvidently granted, with the three concurring justices and four dissent-
ing justices disagreeing over whether the record supported the Louisiana
Court of Appeal’s conclusion.135
In 2002, Jonathan Boyer allegedly robbed and murdered a man.136 State
prosecutors announced that they would seek the death penalty, and Louisi-
ana appointed “experienced trial attorney” Thomas Lorenzi as Boyer’s pri-
mary defense counsel, with assistance from attorneys at the Louisiana
Capital Assistance Center (“LCAC”).137 While the LCAC attorneys were paid
by the state, “there was confusion about which branch of the state govern-
ment was responsible for paying Mr. Lorenzi’s fees.”138 The concurrence and
dissent diverged on the primary cause of the delay in bringing Boyer to trial.
Justice Alito’s concurrence attributed the delay not to funding issues but
largely to “voluminous” defense motions.139 By contrast, Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent deferred to the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s finding that “most of the
delay in Boyer’s case was caused by the State’s failure to pay for his defense
due to a ‘ “funding crisis” experienced by the State of Louisiana.’ ”140 Down-
playing the extent of the time-consuming defense practices, the dissenting
justices emphatically noted that they would have remanded the case to the
lower court to reassess the Barker factors, this time counting the delay
caused by lack of indigent-defense funding against the state.141
132. 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013).
133. Id. at 1706 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. at 1702 (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
135. Id. at 1703.
136. Id. at 1702.
137. Id. at 1702–03.
138. Id. at 1703.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1704 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Boyer, 56 So. 3d 1119, 1142
(La. Ct. App. 2011)).
141. Id. at 1706–08.
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Drawing on Barker and Brillon dicta, Justice Sotomayor wrote unequiv-
ocally that a defendant cannot logically be faulted for state funding decisions
that are out of his control, and she reasoned as follows:
A State’s failure to provide adequate funding for an indigent’s defense that
prevents a case from going to trial is no different [from court overcrowding
or a systemic breakdown in the public defender system]. . . . The failure to
fund an indigent’s defense is not as serious as a deliberate effort by a State
to cause delay. . . . But States routinely make tradeoffs in the allocation of
limited resources, and it is reasonable that a State bear the consequences of
these choices.142
After decades of failed challenges to underresourced public-defender
systems for ineffective counsel, the dissenters acknowledged that providing
inadequate funding for indigent defense might amount to a violation of a
fundamental right that could warrant overturning a conviction.143
But Justice Sotomayor went beyond Boyer’s individual situation to cri-
tique Louisiana’s broader violation of trial rights. She called the dismissal of
certiorari “especially regrettable” because the case “appear[ed] to be illustra-
tive of larger, systemic problems.”144 She lamented that 22% of pending
cases in New Orleans were more than a year old, that Calcasieu Parish had a
501-day (16.5 month) average time between arrest and trial, and that indi-
gent defenders had untenably high caseloads across the state.145 Justice
Sotomayor also expressed concern that “[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court has
suggested on multiple occasions that the State’s failure to provide funding
for indigent defense contributes to extended pretrial detentions.”146
There are potentially significant ramifications of Justice Sotomayor’s cri-
tique about understaffing and delay—a critique that came shortly after a
citation to Brillon’s language intimating that “[d]elay resulting from a sys-
temic breakdown in the public defender system[ ] could be charged to the
State.”147 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion suggests that, when underfunding and
understaffing result in pretrial extended detention, these administrative
problems merit the Court’s scrutiny and criticism and should be resolved.
142. Id. at 1706–07 (citation omitted).
143. See id. at 1707 (“I take no view as to how the other elements of the Barker inquiry
should be weighed, or the ultimate issue whether the delay violated Boyer’s right to speedy
trial. Instead, I would . . . hold that, under Barker, any delay that results from a State’s failure
to provide funding for an indigent’s defense weighs against the state. On remand, the Louisi-
ana court could conduct the Barker analysis under the correct legal standard.”).
144. Id. at 1708.
145. Id. at 1708 (citing Michael M. Kurth & Daryl V. Burckel, Defending the Indi-
gent in Southwest Louisiana 27 (2003); Ernie Lewis & Dan Goyette, Report on the
Evaluation of the Office of the Orleans Public Defenders 28–29 (2012); Nat’l Legal
Aid & Defender Ass’n, In Defense of Public Access to Justice, An Assessment of
Trial-Level Indigent Defense Services in Louisiana 40 Years After Gideon 35 & n.119
(2004); Metro. Crime Comm’n, 2011 Orleans Parish Judicial Accountability Report 1
(2012)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1706 (first alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Moreover, while Justice Sotomayor does not reference Doggett specifically in
her dissent, her criticism of the “one-year-old” cases in New Orleans148 lends
additional support to the idea that a delay as short as one year is constitu-
tionally significant in determining whether speedy trial rights have been
violated.
Critically, the justices concurring in the dismissal did not disagree with
the dissent’s legal analysis but diverged in their assessment of the primary
source of Boyer’s seven-year delay given the facts on the record.149 After de-
cades of failing to force adequate funding as well as more general reform of
public-defender systems for ineffective counsel, the Supreme Court came
within a vote of making systemic delays in public-defender systems a reason
for overturning convictions. Boyer is not the law of the land, of course, but
its strong dissent, in conjunction with Barker, Doggett, Ewell, Brillon, and the
circuit courts’ rulings on appellate practice,150 suggests that a sound case
may be made that delay caused by a lack of funding counts against the gov-
ernment for purposes of calculating speedy trial violations. The defense bar
just needs a model client to bring the issue to the Court again.
C. How Boyer Applies to Barker
This Section reiterates that the sequester caused significant delays to
criminal trials and that, when analyzed through the constitutional lens of
the Barker line of cases, these delays should count against the government
for purposes of speedy trial violations. While the Section focuses mainly on
the sequester and the federal indigent-defense system, the arguments
broadly apply as well to delays in state criminal trials precipitated by insuffi-
cient state funding for indigent-defender systems.
In broad terms, federal-defender furloughs mean more time before
cases are resolved.151 The time it takes a federal case to go to trial already
pushes the “presumptively prejudicial” one-year baseline noted in Doggett.152
In 2011, for example, the median time from filing to disposition for a crimi-
nal defendant who goes to a jury trial was 15.7 months.153 The sequester
148. Id. at 1708.
149. Id. at 1703–04 (Alito, J., concurring). Professor Little speculates that “Justice
Sotomayor’s [dissenting] opinion almost reads as though it began as a majority, but then
Justice Alito (who seemed favorably inclined on Boyer’s narrow point at oral argument)
thought better of it.” Rory Little, The Court “DIGs” in Boyer v. Louisiana—and Sometimes
Silence Can Speak Volumes, SCOTUSBlog (Apr. 30, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2013/04/the-court-digs-in-boyer-v-louisiana-and-sometimes-silence-can-speak-vol
umes/.
150. See supra note 105.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 31–52 for a discussion of how cuts to federal
funding inhibit the ability to bring cases to trial quickly.
152. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (noting that “the lower courts
have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches
one year”).
153. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 26, at 258 tbl.D-10. The median
is lowest in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida (7.3 months) and
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delayed the process of assigning clients their attorneys and prolonged the
time it took defenders to bring a case through the justice system.154 It also
led to extended periods of uncertainty about funding for private attor-
neys155—the same funding concern at the center of Boyer.156
The furloughs, layoffs, time-consuming appointments of CJAs and de-
lays in providing funding to them, and cuts to the courts themselves are all
reasons that should count against the government in determining whether
the right to speedy trial has been violated. They are quintessential “hiring
and firing” and “administrative” decisions that are “made on behalf of the
state,” and they represent a “systemic ‘breakdown in the public defender
system’ ” that can be attributed to the state under Polk County and Brillon.157
And while Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Boyer is only a dissent, her reading
of Barker and Brillon directly supports the idea that a government’s failure
to provide indigent-defense funding counts against the state when assessing
speedy trial violations.158 A defendant cannot be faulted for delays resulting
from inadequate funding, and since governments “routinely make tradeoffs
in the allocation of limited resources . . . it is reasonable that [the govern-
ment] bear the consequences of these choices.”159
While “reason for delay” is only one of the Barker factors, there proba-
bly exists a substantial subset of criminal defendants who have passed the
presumptive-prejudice threshold, whose attorneys have been unable to take
their cases to trial due to the negative effects of inadequate funding, who
have not themselves contributed to delays, and who have experienced
prejudice from such substantial delays. The Barker factors ostensibly support
dismissing many of these defendants’ charges on speedy trial grounds.
The first Barker factor—length of delay resulting in presumptive
prejudice—should open the door to speedy trial analyses in a large number
of current criminal cases. The median time for a federal criminal case to go
from filing to jury trial was 15.7 months in 2011, before the sequester af-
fected judicial budgets; only 20 of 94 districts had a median lower than Dog-
gett’s presumptively prejudicial one-year mark.160 Twelve of 94 districts had
highest in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (47.3 months). Id. at
240–42 tbl.D-6. When the data are broken down by offense, kidnapping (42.2 months), homi-
cide (25.7 months), and money laundering (24.1 months) had the longest median filing-to-
disposition times. Id. at 258–61 tbl.D-10.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 31–41.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 37–44.
156. See Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702, 1703–04 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at
1706–07 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291 n.7 (2009) (dicta) (“A public defender may
act for the State . . . ‘when making hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the State,’ and
‘while performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions.’ ” (quoting Polk
Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981))).
158. Boyer, 133 S. Ct. at 1706 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1707.
160. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 26, at 240–42 tbl.D-6. For state
statistics, see supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
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median disposition times of 2 years or longer, with the Western District of
New York having a median of 47.3 months—or almost 4 years.161 These
times also violate the base timeline laid down in the Speedy Trial Act,162
which, “[a]s the Congressional view of what suffices to satisfy the Constitu-
tion[,] . . . is entitled to much deference.”163 Justice Sotomayor’s critique of
the Louisiana indigent-defense system would similarly find fault with the
federal system: the Boyer dissent noted that 1 parish had many cases that
were more than a year old, and another had an average wait of 501 days
between felony arrest and trial.164 “Conditions of this kind,” Justice
Sotomayor wrote, “cannot persist without endangering constitutional
rights.”165 The furloughs taken by public defenders, the delays in assigning
and paying contract attorneys, and the court closures between March and
October 2013 increased wait times in a system where over half of the defend-
ants already endured more than the presumptively prejudicial one-year time
period to go to trial.
The third Barker factor—assertion of the right—should count delays
resulting from inadequate resources against the government. Where delay is
attributable to the defendant, the defendant is considered to have waived the
right to speedy trial.166 That should not be the case, however, in the many
situations where indigent defendants must wait for counsel to be appointed
or where the defendants’ trials are delayed because their attorney cannot
spend time working on the case. A lack of funding and a breakdown of a
defender system are not within the defendant’s control and are therefore
more properly attributed to the state.167 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself
has specifically cited “a situation in which no counsel is appointed” as an
example that does not count against a defendant.168 Accordingly, any delay in
appointing counsel should unquestionably count against the state. And con-
sidering the Boyer dissent, any delay caused by a CJA’s lack of funding
should also weigh against the state.169 The status of delays resulting from
defender furloughs is less clear, but they are conceivably, like hiring and
firing decisions, a routine “tradeoff” in the allocation of government re-
sources that should count against the state.170 As long as the attorney can
clearly explain which periods of pretrial delay were attributable to the state’s
161. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 26, at 240–42 tbl.D-6. The median
times to jury trial for these districts are as follows: E.D.N.Y. (24.0); E.D. Ky. (24.1); S.D.N.Y.
(24.4); D. Mass. (25.3); D. Colo. (25.7); N.D. Cal. (27.7); N.D. Ill. (29.4); E.D. Mich. (29.5);
E.D. Cal. (29.8); D.V.I. (30.0); D.D.C. (34.5); and W.D.N.Y. (47.3). Id.
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012).
163. United States v. Horton, 705 F.2d 1414, 1416 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983).
164. Boyer, 133 S. Ct. at 1708–09 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1709.
166. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).
167. See supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text.
168. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.
169. Boyer, 133 S. Ct. at 1706–07 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
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inadequate provision of resources rather than to her legal strategy—such as
the “voluminous” motions practice mentioned in Justice Alito’s concur-
rence171—a defendant should be able to assert his right to speedy trial based
on the third Barker factor.172
The final Barker factor—prejudice to the defendant—is extremely sali-
ent in both the federal and state criminal justice systems. Delays caused by
furloughed defenders and late appointment of counsel will result in (1) op-
pressive pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern on the part of the
accused, and (3) the possibility that the defense will be impaired, all of
which the right to speedy trial is intended to protect against.173 In fact, a
significant number of defendants suffer the oppression of pretrial incarcera-
tion: in 1994, 34% of federal defendants were detained by the court pending
adjudication,174 while a 1990–2004 survey of state criminal defendants in the
75 largest counties found that 38% of state felony defendants remained in
detention pending adjudication.175 Even the majority of defendants released
prior to adjudication suffer the anxiety of pending criminal procedures. For
courts that read Doggett as not requiring proof of particularized prejudice to
a defendant’s case,176 the first two elements plus the possibility of actual
prejudice should be enough to find a speedy trial right violation under this
factor, even when the defendant did not suffer “oppressive pretrial
incarceration.”177
More than half of federal criminal cases met the threshold presumptive-
prejudice requirement necessary to trigger a full Barker analysis before the
sequester.178 With furloughs of up to twenty days for federal defenders,
delayed appointments and pay for CJAs, and the closing of courts on
Fridays, these delays inevitably became longer—and, under Barker’s second
and third factors, such delays are attributable entirely to the state. The one-
time injection of funding in October 2013 was a promising start, but these
delays will snowball if Congress fails to restore the federal-defender system’s
171. Id. at 1703 (Alito, J., concurring).
172. This does presuppose that the defendant has access to an attorney who can bring the
speedy trial violation claim in the first place—not a given when some defendants wait months
without meeting with counsel. See supra note 67. For jurisdictions where this is a recurring
danger, injunctive relief may be the most effective remedy. See infra Section III.B.
173. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
174. John Scalia, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Pretrial Release and Detention,
1996, at 1 (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fprd96.pdf.
175. Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pretrial Release
of Felony Defendants in State Courts 1 (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
176. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
177. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Admittedly, the affirmative-showing requirements of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits might foreclose the dismissal of an indictment on grounds of delay
resulting from the sequester. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
178. Supra text accompanying note 26.
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budget to 2011 levels and maintain the funding necessary to protect Sixth
Amendment rights.179
D. The Benefits of Making a Speedy Trial Claim Instead of an
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
The crucial difference between making a speedy trial violation claim and
an ineffective assistance claim is that, for speedy trial claims brought in
many circuits, long delays create a presumption of prejudice that the govern-
ment must rebut rather than leaving the burden on the defendant.180 Admit-
tedly, in cases involving only brief delays, a defendant must still show how
the delay caused prejudice to his defense.181 But outside the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits, a defendant who has endured a sufficiently long pretrial delay
need not offer “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice” to establish a
violation of his speedy trial right;182 when the “portion of the delay attribu-
table to the Government[ ] . . . far exceeds the threshold needed to state a
speedy trial claim . . . and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspec-
ified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant’s acquiescence, nor persua-
sively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief.”183 In other words, the
defendant need not show that he would have been found not guilty but for
this violation of a Sixth Amendment right.
Without having to prove actual prejudice under Strickland—and under
the reasoning from Brillon and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Boyer that a
breakdown of the public-defender system related to lack of funding could be
counted against the state—a defendant or public-defender system would
have to show the following: (1) that it took more than a year to go to trial;
(2) that government action caused the delay; and (3) that the defendant
suffered harm in the form of pretrial incarceration, anxiety, or a nonaf-
firmative showing of prejudice. Compared to showing prejudice under
Strickland, it should be far easier to argue, for example, that the public de-
fender could not work on the defendant’s case because he was furloughed
that day, or that he could not bring this case to trial for three months be-
cause the state ran out of funding for indigent defense. Although the proce-
dural hurdles that make ineffective assistance claims difficult to bring also
apply to speedy trial claims,184 removing the Strickland requirement of show-
ing actual prejudice should make the most egregiously delayed criminal
cases appealable as speedy trial violations.
179. Delays in many state courts have already snowballed out of control. See supra Section
I.B.
180. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
182. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992).
183. Id. at 657–58 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
184. See supra note 74 (describing how federal courts will not take habeas claims for cases
on direct appeal in state courts).
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III. Applying Legal Analysis to Potential Remedies for
Speedy Trial Violations
This Part discusses two potential tools to protect indigent defendants’
right to speedy trial. Section III.A addresses individual relief, which is well
established in law but potentially time consuming for indigent defenders to
pursue en masse. Section III.B argues that, in the most chronically un-
derfunded jurisdictions with system-wide delays in bringing cases to trial,
the most efficient and meaningful protection of the right to speedy trial can
and should come from lawsuits seeking structural injunctions requiring the
increased allocation of resources for indigent defense. Both remedies have
their strengths and weaknesses, and they accordingly should be useful in
different contexts. In jurisdictions where violations are relatively rare but
there are a handful of especially extreme delays in bringing defendants to
trial, indigent defenders should pursue individual challenges. In jurisdic-
tions where speedy trial violations are pervasive but less extreme, by con-
trast, it is not effective for indigent defenders repeatedly to litigate individual
violations. Rather, they should seek more sweeping injunctive relief.
A. Vacation of Sentence as a Potential Individual Remedy for
Speedy Trial Violations
A defendant whose right to speedy trial has been violated is entitled to
vacation of his entire sentence and a dismissal of the indictment.185 While
the failure to afford other constitutional rights, such as a public trial or im-
partial jury, can be cured by providing those rights in a new trial, holding a
new trial when the first trial has already been prejudicially delayed “may
subject the accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to result in
the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of facing public trial
or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is pres-
ently serving”—uncertainties the accused would not have faced had he been
afforded a prompt trial in the first place.186
Individual appeals, then, would certainly provide a remedy to a defen-
dant whose delay was impermissibly long and attributable to a breakdown of
the defender system. In fact, one of the cases delayed by the sequester might
even provide a sufficient factual basis to prompt the Supreme Court to rule
on the question Boyer left unanswered: “Whether a state’s failure to fund
185. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973). Vacation and dismissal are extreme
remedies, and, admittedly, courts are reluctant to grant them. Id. at 438–39. Judges are under-
standably loath to dismiss charges against a defendant when the evidence against that defen-
dant is particularly strong or when the defendant is accused of a serious crime. But federal
judges have been willing to vacate convictions and dismiss charges on speedy trial grounds in
the past. E.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. 647. See supra note 127 for a sample of circuit-court cases
dismissing charges on speedy trial grounds and see supra notes 105–112 and accompanying
text for an overview of appellate cases dismissing charges for appellate speedy trial violations.
Despite the serious nature of this remedy, then, in clear cases of speedy trial violations the
courts have been willing to dismiss charges.
186. Strunk, 412 U.S. at 439.
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counsel for an indigent defendant . . . should be weighed against the state for
speedy trial purposes[?]”187 A resounding yes would have ramifications far
beyond the federal judiciary, particularly in state and local defender offices
that take a long time to assign a defender to the case or that underresource
their defender staffs to the point of delaying trials.188 Fifty years after Gideon,
speedy trial requirements could help effectuate the right to counsel by secur-
ing funding for indigent defense.189
Although individual remedies have great promise for victims of egre-
gious delays, the appeals may be drawn out and costly. It would be impracti-
cal to ask overworked indigent defenders, CJAs, and their pro bono partners
to litigate every case that passes the presumptive threshold for a Barker bal-
ancing test. Indigent defenders simply lack the time or availability to pursue
in large numbers legitimate claims of a constitutional violation of speedy
trial rights, and they would likely find themselves bringing claims implicat-
ing their own offices.190 This means that filing many individual suits may not
be an appropriate long-term strategy for the most egregiously overworked
and underfunded state or local defender systems: the problem of scarce re-
sources makes fighting the consequences of scarce resources more difficult. So,
187. Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702, 1702 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in
original).
188. For instance, in the parishes discussed in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Boyer. See id.
at 1708–09 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
189. While this observation remains outside the scope of this Note, I would suggest that
the Gideon right to counsel loses much of its meaning when the coordinate right to speedy
trial is not protected. Justice Stevens, concurring in Maryland v. Shatzer, objected to the notion
that police could Mirandize a suspect, promise him an attorney, and then attempt to interro-
gate him fourteen days later without an attorney present. 559 U.S. 98, 121 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). When a suspect has been Mirandized and informed that he has the right to an
attorney at no cost, and when a significant period of time has passed but he has not been
provided with a lawyer, the “suspect is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that he
really does not have any right to a lawyer . . . ‘exacerbat[ing] whatever compulsion to speak the
suspect may be feeling.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988)). Surely
a defendant who has been promised an attorney and a speedy trial, only to have that trial
delayed by an overworked or furloughed indigent defender, will conclude that he is better off
resolving his case without a trial in order to avoid staying in jail for seven years before the trial
actually begins. See, e.g., Boyer, 133 S. Ct. at 1703–04 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing
the seven-year delay between arrest and trial). Such a scenario undermines both the adversarial
system of justice and the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
190. In ineffective assistance cases, courts have found a conflict of interest when an appel-
late attorney arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level comes from the same
office as the trial attorney because attorneys from the same office cannot effectively argue their
colleagues’ ineffectiveness. E.g., Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1999). And a
public defender’s (or his colleague’s) arguing that a speedy trial violation resulted from the
state’s inability to fund the public defender’s office superficially appears to raise similar, al-
though not identical, issues. On the one hand, an appellate public defender would be arguing
that his own office was incapable of upholding its constitutional mandate. On the other, he
would be making the argument that ultimate responsibility rests with the state, not with his
own office’s misconduct. This Note is not prepared to determine whether this situation would
actually be a conflict of interest but acknowledges it as a potential challenge of litigating indi-
vidual speedy trial violations.
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while the sequester’s delays might provide an opportunity to choose a model
case to relitigate Boyer and reverse the convictions of a handful of critically
affected individuals, appealing individual speedy trial violations en masse
will be the best use of resources in those jurisdictions that experience wide-
spread delays in bringing indigent defendants to trial. Indigent defenders in
jurisdictions where a chronic lack of resources prevails, by contrast, should
look to injunctive relief to correct structural deficiencies and protect the
right to speedy trial in the long run.
B. Structural Injunctions as Potential Relief for
Systemic Speedy Trial Violations
Ultimately, judicial oversight may be the most effective method of se-
curing the right to speedy trial for indigent defendants in especially re-
source-strapped jurisdictions. Indigent defendants and their attorneys
should sue for structural injunctions requiring increased indigent defense
personnel.191 Both the text of the Criminal Justice Act and precedent from
prison-reform cases suggest that federal courts have the authority to demand
reforms such as hiring more personnel. Analogizing to other areas of consti-
tutional jurisprudence suggests that judicial oversight through structural in-
junctions may be an appropriate remedy to insulate the federal-defender
system from federal-budget fights, and many of the arguments for the legal-
ity and necessity of judicial oversight apply to chronically underfunded state
and local systems.
Structural injunctions are court decrees intended to reform a social in-
stitution.192 They seek to “remodel an existing social or political institution
to bring it into conformity with constitutional demands.”193 In Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court instructed four federal courts to
“take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees” as were necessary
to protect the constitutional rights at issue in the school-desegregation
cases.194 This procedural move opened the door to widespread institutional
reform by “authoriz[ing] district judges to assess the need for, order, and
oversee sweeping changes not only to schools but to the full range of impor-
tant governmental institutions.”195 Of course, general principles of separa-
tion of powers caution that the judiciary should be hesitant to encroach on
the functions of its coordinate branches.196 But when authorities fail in their
191. Again, the removal of Strickland’s prejudice requirements should make this tactic
more successful than the system-wide challenges described supra Section I.C.1.
192. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 9 (1978), available at http://www.law.
yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/injunction.pdf (explaining that structural injunctions seek to
reform a social institution).
193. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 886 F. Supp. 56, 62 (D.D.C. 1995).
194. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550, 552 (2006) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955)).
195. Id.
196. Guggenheim, supra note 72, at 455 n.282.
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affirmative constitutional obligations,197 federal judicial authority may be in-
voked to remedy past violations198 or protect against risks of future viola-
tions.199 Where a constitutional violation has been found, a district judge
may order the expenditure of government funds to correct the condition
that offends the Constitution, as long as the measure is remedial and tai-
lored to the nature and scope of the violation.200
Moreover, the Supreme Court need not explicitly find a constitutional
violation before lower courts can take action. District court judges have in-
dependently “assess[ed] the need for, order[ed], and oversee[n] sweeping
changes . . . to the full range of important governmental institutions.”201
They have used injunctions to reform prisons and mental hospitals, to pro-
tect the environment, and to establish public-housing policy.202 Federal
prison reform presents a particularly appropriate model for judicial over-
sight of indigent-defender systems. Before the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1996 (“PLRA”) statutorily impeded the courts’ ability to intervene in
prison-conditions cases,203 there were many civil suits “in which extensive
changes in prison practices [were] required by the federal courts. Local offi-
cials [were] ordered to do everything from hiring dozens of guards and
other workers and building new, or substantially altering old, facilities, to
appointing a prison ombudsman and creating a Department of Detention
and Correction.”204 District courts may find constitutional rights and viola-
tions without the Supreme Court’s first articulating those rights and viola-
tions, and they may create an adequate remedy even when that remedy will
require hiring staff at additional cost to the government.
197. The Sixth Amendment creates affirmative obligations. Chemerinsky, supra note 20,
at 2685.
198. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”).
199. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 Calif. L.
Rev. 1387, 1395 (2007) (“Some risk of future violation is necessary for prospective relief. But
where future violation is threatened, injunctions are often the only effective relief.”).
200. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
201. See Schlanger, supra note 194, at 552.
202. Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 Yale L.J. 1983,
1983–84 (1990).
203. Michele Deitch, The Need for Independent Prison Oversight in a Post-PLRA World, 24
Fed. Sent’g Rep. 236 (2012). Professor Schlanger argues that the PLRA significantly con-
strained the strong injunctive practice that existed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Schlanger,
supra note 194, at 554. And despite the PLRA, Schlanger asserts that, “[a]t the end of the day,
the civil rights injunction remains stronger than conventional wisdom would have it.” Id. at
555.
204. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted) (providing
an overview of four successful prison-reform cases at the district court level, some of which
the circuit courts subsequently affirmed). The authority was not unlimited; indeed, while the
Second Circuit’s decision in Rhem affirmed that conditions in the institute in question were
unconstitutional, the court still remanded the case, instructing the district court judge to re-
frame his order closing an entire prison. Id. at 340–42. Interestingly for the issue of sequestra-
tion, the Second Circuit noted that “[i]nadequate resources can never be an adequate
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Prison-reform precedent does envisage a limit to the demands that
courts can make on the other branches, however. The Second Circuit ad-
monished one district court judge for issuing an order that placed the judge
“in the difficult position of trying to enforce a direct order to [New York
City] to raise and allocate large sums of money, steps traditionally left to
appropriate executive and legislative bodies responsible to the voters[,]” par-
ticularly when alternatives existed that did not require the district court to
adopt a legislative role.205 But the Second Circuit also noted that when an
“unconstitutionally-administered governmental function must be kept oper-
ating . . . a court might have no choice but to order an expensive, burden-
some, or administratively inconvenient remedy.”206 The Sixth Amendment
provides an affirmative right207: the government has “no choice” but to pro-
vide assistance of counsel to indigent defendants. Since the government
must continue to provide indigent-defense counsel to fulfill its constitu-
tional obligations, a court may have no choice but to order a remedy that
imposes additional costs on the federal government. In a district with partic-
ularly long median times from filing to trial, it is not implausible that a
district court might rely on Brillon and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Boyer
to issue a decree requiring increased funding to remedy systemic speedy trial
violations.208
Moreover, district courts are even better suited to oversee indigent-de-
fense systems than they are to oversee prisons, schools, and other institu-
tions. Regulating aspects of the judiciary can be considered part of lower
courts’ inherent powers.
As the Supreme Court explained . . . when another branch is responsible
for overseeing certain functions, such as running schools or prisons, and
courts conclude that others have greater expertise to make the challenged
decisions, courts should defer to the expert judgment of those branches.
justification for the state’s depriving any person of his constitutional rights. If the state cannot
obtain the resources to detain persons awaiting trial in accordance with minimum constitu-
tional standards, then the state simply will not be permitted to detain such persons.” Id. at 341
n.20 (quoting Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971)). This proposition
has been favorably noted by the Second and Fifth Circuits as well as by several district courts.
E.g., Udey v. Kastner, 805 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp.
2d 974, 979 (S.D. Iowa 2004). And yet the proposition does not seem to be accepted widely
enough for this Note to rely solely on Rhem’s forty-year-old dicta.
205. Rhem, 507 F.2d at 341 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 341 n.19 (emphasis added) (relying on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1971); Medley v. Sch. Bd., 482 F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 1973) (en
banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1172 (1974); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044, 1046 (6th Cir.
1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974)). Such a scenario did not exist in Rhem, the
Second Circuit reasoned, because the district court on remand could impose narrower reme-
dial measures, such as limiting the duration of detainees’ confinement.
207. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2685.
208. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. The Western District of New York, in
particular, might rely on Brillon, the dissent in Boyer, and Rhem to craft a remedy.
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But this principle has no application to the subject of overseeing operation
of federal courts.209
Judges are not experts in education or prison administration. Still, by nature
of their office, federal judges should be experts in the requirements of the
adversarial process and a fair trial.
While some might argue that such a structural injunction violates the
separation of powers, the Supreme Court has recognized a “ ‘twilight area’ in
which the activities of the separate Branches merge.”210 Rulemaking is an
example of such a twilight area: the Court has recognized that Congress
delegated to the courts its power to engage in a quasilegislative, nonadjudi-
catory activity.211 In the case of reforming indigent defense through injunc-
tions, the courts would also operate in such a twilight area, which would
mitigate the severity of the judicial branch’s encroaching on legislatures’ re-
source-allocation function. The modern formulation of the Criminal Justice
Act states as follows:
Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial council
of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain ade-
quate representation . . . . Representation under each plan shall include
counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary for adequate
representation.212
This language strongly indicates the delegation of at least some power to
circuit and district court judges and perhaps grants some leeway for
nonadjudicatory steps to be taken within the sphere of providing for indi-
gent defense. The text also suggests that Congress is willing to defer in some
measure to judges’ expertise in the needs of indigent defense in their juris-
dictions.213 These signals from Congress support greater judicial oversight of
209. Guggenheim, supra note 72, at 454 (emphasis in original) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979)).
210. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989).
211. Id. at 386–87.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2012). On the issue of funding, the Act states that “[t]here are
authorized to be appropriated to the United States courts, out of any money in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, sums necessary to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .
When so specified in appropriation acts, such appropriations shall remain available until ex-
pended.” Id. § 3006A(i).
213. Additionally, in desegregation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court recognized that the
federal courts’ decentralization “made it possible for them to individuate application of law to
fact and to enter injunctions tailored to address particular or even unique circumstances, insti-
tution by institution.” Schlanger, supra note 194, at 552. Many federal districts and state judi-
cial districts have wildly different median times to trial. See supra notes 160–161 and
accompanying text; supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. Federal district court judges are
well placed to fashion remedies that take into account the disparities among individual
districts.
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indigent defense and partially mitigate concerns about the judiciary’s en-
croaching on a coordinate branch.214
While there are certainly risks to seeking injunctive relief rather than
pursuing individual remedies or waiting for additional legislative funding,
there are also significant advantages. When authorities fail to protect an af-
firmative constitutional right, federal courts are ultimately entitled to craft a
remedy for the violation.215 The disadvantage of this option, compared with
Congress’s simply reinstating federal-defender funding at presequester
levels, is that the process of obtaining relief is likely to take months—if not
years—and will apply only to a single jurisdiction. And yet providing de-
fendants relief for speedy trial violations is an established part of federal and
state jurisprudence: it is only a small step to imagine a court reversing an
individual conviction because of a speedy trial violation due to lack of fund-
ing for indigent defense. It would be a considerably larger step to craft a new
remedy for systemic violations of the right to speedy trial by joining the
constitutional violations hinted at in Brillon’s dicta and Boyer’s dissent with
the drastic remedies of desegregation and prison-reform rulings. Applying a
judicial remedy requires that an attorney make (and a federal court accept)
two arguments that the Supreme Court has not yet endorsed: that delays
caused by lack of funding for indigent defense violate a defendant’s right to
speedy trial, and that a federal court has the authority to mandate reforms of
an indigent-defense system. By contrast, arguing that an indictment should
be dismissed for lack of speedy trial requires only that a federal court accept
the first argument.
Yet the benefit of making the two-pronged argument for judicial over-
sight greatly outweighs the risk. Crafting a judicial remedy based on a sys-
temic violation of speedy trial would insulate the jurisdiction’s indigent-
defense program and its defendants’ rights from the uncertainties of parti-
san politics. And although the litigation would take time and judicial re-
sources, so would the process of throwing out individual indictments on
speedy trial grounds. In districts where many trials take much longer than
the presumptively prejudicial one-year mark, it may be a more effective use
of defender and court resources to consolidate the claims into a large action
alleging systemic violations than repeatedly to litigate variations on the same
individual claims.216 In light of the dissent in Boyer, the challenges to timely
adjudication presented by the sequester, the general power of district courts
to craft remedies for constitutional violations, and Congress’s statutory ex-
pression of some deference to the judiciary on providing for indigent de-
fense, judicial oversight may serve as a legal and necessary means to restore
214. Naturally, this argument—rooted in the Criminal Justice Act and the delegation of
powers—does not apply to state and local defender systems.
215. Federal judges, in particular, are better suited to demand unpopular funding in-
creases for indigent defendants because they have life tenure—unlike their elected state coun-
terparts. See Primus, supra note 60, at 2.
216. Cf. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1548–54 (10th Cir. 1994) (consolidating ap-
proximately 302 habeas petitions arising from lengthy delays in filing appellate briefs by court-
appointed indigent-defense counsel in Oklahoma).
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adequate funding to the federal defender and prevent systemic violations of
the right to speedy trial.
Conclusion
Indigent-defense systems suffer from an acute lack of resources, which
often creates long delays in bringing cases to trial. Under Doggett, Brillon,
and the dissent in Boyer, such delays caused by a lack of funding for indigent
defense may be counted against the government for purposes of determining
a speedy trial violation. Indigent defendants who face long delays because
they have been assigned an overworked attorney should appeal on the
grounds of speedy trial violations, and indigent-defense systems in jurisdic-
tions with the longest delays should seek injunctions requiring increased
funding for their organizations. If these measures are not taken, people who
have not been found guilty will continue to languish in jails, with the specter
of a criminal prosecution hanging over them and the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantees remaining unfulfilled.
